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Abstract	
In	recent	years,	carbon	has	been	increasingly	rendered	‘visible’	both	discursively	and	through	
political	processes	that	have	imbued	it	with	economic	value.	Greenhouse	gas	emissions	have	
been	 constructed	 as	 social	 and	 environmental	 costs	 and	 their	 reduction	 or	 avoidance	 as	
social	and	economic	gain.	The	 ‘marketisation’	of	carbon,	which	has	been	facilitated	through	
various	 compliance	 schemes	 such	 as	 the	 European	 Union	 Emissions	 Trading	 Scheme,	 the	
Kyoto	 Protocol,	 the	 proposed	 Australian	 Emissions	 Reduction	 Scheme	 and	 through	 the	
voluntary	carbon	credit	market,	have	attempted	to	bring	carbon	into	the	 ‘foreground’	as	an	
economic	 liability	 and/or	 opportunity.	 Accompanying	 the	 increasing	 economic	 visibility	 of	
carbon	 are	 reports	 of	 frauds	 and	 scams	 –	 the	 ‘gaming	 of	 carbon	markets’(Chan	 2010).	 As	
Lohmann	(2010:	21)	points	out,	 ‘what	are	conventionally	classed	as	scams	or	frauds	are	an	
inevitable	 feature	 of	 carbon	 offset	 markets,	 not	 something	 that	 could	 be	 eliminated	 by	
regulation	targeting	the	specific	businesses	or	state	agencies	involved’.	This	paper	critiques	
the	disparate	discourses	of	fraud	risk	in	carbon	markets	and	examines	cases	of	fraud	within	
emerging	landscapes	of	green	criminology.	
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Introduction	
	
As	 carbon	 trading	 booms,	 fraudsters—and	 cops—are	 getting	 into	 the	 game.	
(Shapiro	2010)	
	
Carbon	 dioxide,	 a	 toxic	 air	 pollutant,	 has	 in	 recent	 years	 become	 an	 economic	 opportunity	
through	projects	 that	 abate	 or	 reduce	 emissions.	 ‘Credits’	 derived	 from	 these	 projects	 can	be	
traded	in	both	the	compliance	and	voluntary	markets	and	used	to	‘offset’	emissions.	
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Widespread	fraud	in	trading	in	the	European	Union	Emission	Trading	System	(EU	ETS)	and	in	
the	production	and	sale	of	carbon	credits	from	carbon	abatement	projects	(offset	projects)	has	
been	widely	 reported	 in	 the	media	 (Lohmann	2010).	 Anthropogenic	 climate	 change	 is	 highly	
politicised	and	claims	of	 fraud	are	asserted	by	disparate	political	 actors,	 from	green	 lobbyists	
who	 argue	 that	 carbon	markets	 are	 a	 form	of	 ‘commodification	 of	 nature’	 to	 climate	 sceptics	
who	 link	 carbon	 fraud	 as	 one	 of	 the	 arguments	 for	 inaction	 on	 global	 warming	 (MacKenzie	
2009:	451).	Carbon	fraud	discourse	is	situated	within	this	ideological	contest	and	is	often	drawn	
on	as	an	argument	within	a	more	generalised	critique	of	offset	credit	schemes.		
	
There	is	a	dearth	of	scholarly	literature	assessing	the	risk	of	carbon	fraud	and	little	examination	
of	the	problem	from	a	criminological	perspective	(Drew	and	Drew	2010).	Questions	regarding	
the	 nature	 and	 extent	 of	 fraud	 in	 these	 contexts	 and	 their	 relationship	 to	 the	 quite	 unique	
institutional	arrangements	of	carbon	markets	have	been	left	unanswered	and	undeveloped.	To	
what	 extent	 is	 fraud	 and	 fraud	 risk	 related	 to	 carbon	 commodification	 and	marketisation?	 Is	
carbon	 simply	 another	 context	 for	 traditional	 scamming	 and	 fraud	or	 is	 there	 some	 systemic	
relation	between	carbon	marketisation	and	fraud?	This	article	will	address	these	questions	and	
assess	the	extent	to	which	carbon	has	become	socially	and	economically	visible	with	a	market	
identity	of	special	significance.		
	
The	carbon	markets	
The	origins	of	carbon	markets	or	emissions	trading	are	found	in	the	1997	Kyoto	Protocol.	In	an	
attempt	to	reduce	global	greenhouse	emissions,	Kyoto	established	a	range	of	mechanisms	that	
would	incentivise	nation	states	and	corporate	polluters	to	lower	air	pollution	levels.	In	essence,	
Kyoto	 created	 a	 new	 political	 and	 economic	 identity	 for	 carbon	 dioxide	 through	 its	
incorporation	into	global	trade	networks.	As	a	result,	carbon	has	become	a	‘property	like	right’	
(Christensen	et	al.	2013)	where	the	big	polluters	can	trade	in	carbon	certificates	which	grant	a	
right	to	emit.		
	
Carbon	 markets	 are	 artificially	 constructed	 mechanisms	 that	 aim	 to	 internalise	 the	 costs	 of	
greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	pollution	within	firms.	As	such,	they	provide	a	price	signal	to	companies	
that	encourage	minimisation	of	GHG	emissions	or	a	displacement	of	emission	savings	through	
offsets.	Markets	can	only	occur	when	the	commodities	being	traded	are	commensurable	and	so	
exchange	values	must	be	known	and	trusted.	GHG	instruments	are	remarkable	to	the	extent	that	
they	 represent	 no	 value	 as	 a	 tangible	 commodity	 but	 instead	 represent	 a	 permit	 or,	 more	
accurately,	a	means	of	settling	a	liability	created	through	GHG	emissions	(Mackenzie	2009:	448).		
In	creating	this	symbolic	commodity,	a	multiplicity	of	projects	and	technologies	in	action	must	
be	 made	 commensurate.	Given	 this	 process,	 plus	 the	 intangibility	 of	 the	 instrument	 and	 the	
political	 basis	 for	 its	 value,	 issues	 of	 compliance,	 regulation	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 fraud	 are	
significant	concerns	(Drew	and	Drew	2010).	
	
Carbon	markets	 take	varied	 institutional	 forms	 reflecting	 the	political	 contingencies	of	nation	
states	and	supranational	agreements.	 It	 is	useful	 to	understand	 them	along	 two	dimensions	–	
firstly,	whether	they	are	compliance	or	voluntary	markets	and	secondly,	whether	the	primary	
transactions	of	carbon	instruments	are	to	settle	GHG	liabilities	(paying	to	pollute)	or	to	create	
carbon	assets.	These	assets	can	be	created	through	a	firm	reducing	their	emissions	or	through	
other	offsite	projects	that	reduce	emissions.	Firms	can	buy	‘offset	credits’	from	these	projects	to	
offset	their	own	emissions.	Examples	of	offset	projects	in	Australia	include	a	Methane	producing	
piggery	at	Young,	NSW		(ABC	News	2012)	estimated	at	producing	$80,000	per	year	of	credits;	
and	an	Indigenous	fire	management	project	(Middleton	2013)	in	the	Northern	Territory	where	
altering	 fire	 regimes	 has	 been	 estimated	 to	 produce	 about	 20,000	 credits	 per	 year	
(approximately	$100,000	per	year).	Firms	 can	also	 source	 international	 offset	 credits	derived	
from	projects	 like	reafforestation	and	hydro‐electric	 schemes.	There	 is	also	a	 third	dimension	
related	 to	 the	 ‘tradability’	 of	 instruments	 both	 internally	 and	 with	 external	 markets.	 For	
Peter	Martin	and	Reece	Walters:	Fraud	Risk	and	the	Visibility	of	Carbon	
	
IJCJ&SD						29	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2013	2(2)	
example,	 the	 so‐called	 carbon	 tax	 in	Australia	 is	more	 accurately	 conceived	 as	 an	 ‘allowance’	
scheme	 that	 is	 non‐tradeable	 and	 to	 which	 liable	 entities	 must	 comply.	 In	 this	 scheme,	
Australian	Carbon	Units	(ACUs)	must	be	purchased	by	emitters	and	immediately	‘surrendered’	
–	 so	 they	are	not	 ‘bankable’	or	 ‘tradeable’.	The	price	of	ACUs	 is	 set	by	 the	government	rather	
than	 by	 price	 discovery	 through	 trading.	 In	 2015,	 this	 scheme	 becomes	 a	 market	 through	
allowing	banking	and	transferability.	Price	is	then	set	by	the	‘market’	but	the	availability	or	cap	
of	ACUs	is	set	by	the	government	to	create	scarcity.	
	
The	more	recent	announcements	in	Australia	of	a	staged	link	with	EU	ETS	(which	commenced	in	
2005)	serve	to	illustrate	the	variability	and	contingency	of	carbon	markets,	and	also	how	they	
interact.	 This	 could	 have	 implications	 for	 fraud	 and	 fraud	 risk	 particularly	 if	 tradable	
relationships	 between	 different	markets	 are	 not	 accompanied	 by	 the	 harmonisation	 of	 other	
related	regulations	–	for	example,	tax	regimes	and	access	to	offset	markets.		
	
To	explain	how	 the	markets	 ‘work’,	we	will	describe	how	a	mining	company	 in	Australia	will	
interact	 with	 the	 carbon	 markets	 with	 full	 integration	 with	 the	 EU	 ETS	 within	 the	 current	
legislation.	Because	the	Australian	scheme	is	a	‘compliance’	scheme,	they	are	required	by	law	to	
account	and	pay	for	their	GHG	emissions.	 In	market	terms,	these	emissions	are	understood	as	
creating	a	liability	(similar	to	that	of	a	firm	borrowing	money).	This	liability	must	be	met	within	
a	certain	period	of	time.	The	mining	company	has	a	number	of	options:		
	
 Upgrade	its	operations	to	reduce	emissions	and	hence	the	liability	
 Purchase	allowances	from	the	Australian	or	European	market	
 Purchase	allowances	from	government‐run	auctions	
 Purchase	credits	produced	from	Australian	or	International	offset	projects.	
	
The	 particular	 strategy	 that	 the	 company	 uses	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 prices	 for	 the	 credits	 or	
allowances	and	the	marginal	costs	involved	with	reducing	emissions.		
	
All	 offset	 credits	 can	 be	 purchased	 in	 the	 voluntary	markets	 but	 only	 specifically	 accredited	
credits,	such	as	those	regulated	by	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM)	or	other	national	
or	international	accreditations	systems,	can	be	traded	in	compliance	markets	(Kyoto,	European	
ETS	and	proposed	markets	such	as	the	Australian	and	Californian	ETS).	The	voluntary	markets	
are	 relatively	 small,	 transacting	 about	 93	 megatonnes	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 (CO2)	 compared	 to	
10,000	 megatonnes	 in	 the	 compliance	 markets	 (Peters‐Stanley	 and	 Hamilton	 2012:	 iv).	
Purchases	are	commonly	made	by	companies	that	wish	to	demonstrate	corporate	responsibility	
and	 attract	 business	 by	 growing	 their	 image	 as	 ‘environmentally	 friendly’	 and	 enhanced	
branding	 (Peters‐Stanley	 2008).	 Key	 buyers	 are	 major	 airlines	 and	 financial	 but	 there	 are	 a	
myriad	 of	 smaller	 buyers	 from	 event	 organisers,	 community	 groups	 and	 individuals.	 	 The	
voluntary	market	is	largely	unregulated	by	the	state	and,	whilst	being	regarded	initially	as	the	
‘wild	west’	of	carbon	markets,	has	seen	some	increasing	self‐regulation	and	greater	standards	of	
accreditation	and	certification	(Hamilton	et	al.	2008:	53).		
	
Carbon	fraud	discourse	
Allegations	 of	 ‘fraud’	 are	 common	 in	 the	 media	 and	 have	 come	 to	 represent	 a	 diversity	 of	
criticisms	 from	 (actual	 and	potential)	misrepresentation	 in	 the	 carbon	markets	 and	 ‘fraud’	 as	
government	deception	of	‘the	people’,	to	actual	criminal	fraud	in	the	compliance	and	voluntary	
carbon	 markets.	 The	 shifting	 of	 meaning	 from	 the	 criminological	 to	 the	 political	 enhances	
critiques	 of	 carbon	 markets.	 These	 carbon	 market	 technologies	 have	 come	 under	 increased	
scrutiny	since	they	are	intimately	linked	with	debates	around	global	warming.		
	
The	media	has	widely	reported	the	risk	of	carbon	fraud	in	both	the	allowance	markets	(EU	ETS)	
and	the	offset	credit	market	(Barrett	2011;	Lohmann	2010:	21;	Shapiro	2010).	Large	accounting	
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firms	 are	 informing	 their	 clients	 and	 releasing	 scoping	 documents	 such	 as	 Deloitte’s	 'Carbon	
Credit	Fraud	–	The	White	Collar	Crime	of	the	Future’	and,	more	recently,	‘Carbon	Credit	Fraud	–	
An	Update’.	Europol	(2011:	29‐30,	48)	and	Interpol	(Wynn	and	Creagh	2009)	have	both	warned	
of	 the	high	risk	of	organised	crime	 involvement	 in	carbon	 fraud.	Peter	Younger	 from	 Interpol	
warned	of	the	risks	of	organised	crime	in	the	forestry	sector	and	his	comments	were	picked	up	
by	 Reuters,	 the	 major	 daily	 newspapers	 in	 Australia,	 and	 in	 NGO	 commentary	 (for	 example	
Gilbertson	 and	 Reyes	 2009:	 63).	 	 Similarly,	 The	 Australian	 Crime	 Commission’s	 (ACC)	 latest	
report	 on	 organised	 crime	 briefly	 mentions	 potential	 carbon	 fraud	 as	 a	 non‐traditional	
organised	crime	activity	(2011:	33).	
	
The	 most	 sustained	 critiques	 on	 carbon	 credit	 fraud	 risk	 have	 come	 from	 NGOs	 such	 as	
Transparency	 International	 (2011),	 Global	 Witness	 in	 their	 report	 ‘Forest	 Carbon	 Cash	 and	
Crime’	 (2011),	 and	 Greenpeace’s	 ‘Carbon	 Scam’	 (2009).	 The	 Corner	 House	 has	maintained	 a	
sustained	 critique	 of	 carbon	 trading	 over	 the	 last	 decade	 (Gilbertson	 and	 Reyes	 2009)	 with	
some	mention	 of	 criminal	 fraud	 (Gilbertson	 and	 Reyes	 2009:	 73)	 and	 corruption	 (Gilbertson	
and	 Reyes	 2009:	 63).	 These	 reports	 question	 the	 authenticity	 of	 carbon	 credit	 schemes	
particularly	in	UN	Reducing	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	Forest	Degradation	(UN‐REDD)	
subnational	 projects	 and	warn	of	 the	 risks	of	 criminal	 engagement	 in	 these	 schemes.	Most	of	
these	reports	again	identify	risks	rather	than	actual	cases	although	a	number	of	anecdotes	are	
given.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 ‘Carbon	 Scam’,	 Greenpeace	 analyses	 in	 detail	 the	 Noel	 Kempff	 Climate	
Action	 Project	 in	 Bolivia	 and	 identifies	major	 shortcomings	 in	 the	 net	 emissions	 savings	 and	
‘avoided	deforestation’	(2009:	9‐13).	Such	reports	imply	that	the	lobbying	power	exerted	by	the	
powerful	participating	 companies	and	 the	 relative	weakness	of	 the	 regulatory	 structure	gives	
rise	 to	 form	 of	 carbon	 fraud	 or	 ‘scam’	 at	 the	 global	 level.	 These	 weaknesses,	 however,	 also	
points	to	areas	that	could	be	exploited	by	organised	crime	and	state	corruption.	Table	1	lists	the	
types	of	carbon	crimes	reported	by	the	media,	police	agencies	and	NGOs.	
	
Table	1:	Typologies	of	carbon	crimes	
Typology	 Crime	risk	 Markets	affected	
Computer	crime	 Internet	phishing,	cyber‐theft	 Allowances,	EU	ETS	
State	crime	 Recycling	of	carbon	instruments	 Allowances,	EU	ETS	
Taxation	crime	 Missing‐trader	fraud	(MTF)	 Allowances,	EU	ETS	
Scams	 Investment	 scams,	 fake	 carbon	 credits,	
Ponzi	schemes	
Carbon	 credits	 for	 voluntary	
market	
Corruption	and	bribery	 Falsifying	 records,	 fake	 offset	 schemes,	
pressure	on	local	people.	
Carbon	credits	for	voluntary	and	
compliance	market	
Structural	fraud	 Fraud	 risk	 through	 poor	 incentive	
structure,	 inadequate	 validation	 and	
verification.	
Carbon	credits	in	for	compliance	
markets	
	
In	 the	 scholarly	 literature,	 there	 is	 significant	 critical	 work	 examining	 carbon	markets	 as	 an	
extension	of	neoliberal	governance	and	the	commodification	of	nature	(see		Bailey	et	al.	2011;	
Paton	 and	 Bryant	 2012;	 Pearse	 2011;	 Thornes	 and	 Randalls	 2007).	 Notably,	 some	 scholars	
argue	 that	carbon	 fraud	 is	symptomatic	of	wider	 systemic	properties	of	 carbon	marketisation	
that	 are	 inherently	 corruptible	 (Lohmann	 2010)	 and	 fraudulent	 (Bachram	 2004)	 and	 this	
connects	with	 concerns	 of	NGOs.	 These	 critics	 believe	 that	 the	way	 incentives	 are	 structured	
creates	an	essentially	unregulatable	market.	This	will	be	 further	elaborated	in	a	discussion	on	
‘additionality’	 later	 in	 the	 paper.	 Others,	 however,	 argue	 that	 ‘marketisation’	 of	 carbon	 is	 a	
political	 project	 itself	 and	 can	 be	 shaped	 by	 social	 concern	 for	 its	 negative	 consequences	
(MacKenzie	2009).	
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Some	of	 the	 literature	briefly	mentions	criminal	 fraud	–	often	as	 taken	 for	granted	within	 the	
offset	carbon	context.	For	example,	Chan	(2009:	159)	states	that	‘…	the	opportunities	for	fraud	
and	manipulation	in	the	offset	market	are	significant	and	well‐recognised’	as	if	carbon	fraud	is	
common	 knowledge.	 Others,	 such	 as	 Sedjo	 and	Macauley	 (2011:	 472)	 cite	The	Guardian	 and	
NGO	sources	for	‘Finally,	fraud	has	already	emerged	as	a	problem	in	both	the	developing	world	
and	elsewhere	and	could	become	more	serious	if	the	values	grow	substantially’.		The	passage	of	
text	 cited	 from	 the	 NGO	 simply	 states	 that	 ‘Without	 accuracy,	 appraisals	 of	 timber	 will	 be	
discredited,	 assays	 of	 biomass	 will	 be	 deceptive,	 and	 claims	 of	 sequestered	 carbon	 may	 be	
fraudulent’.	 Fraud	 is	 marginal	 in	 these	 studies	 but	 ironically	 is	 elevated	 from	 possibility	 to	
reality.	 Hence,	much	 of	 the	 critical	 scholarly	 literature	 provides	 little	 insight	 into	 the	 risks	 of	
fraud	in	carbon	markets	in	general	and	the	vulnerability	of	the	Australian	system	in	particular.			
Carbon	 fraud	 discourse	 is	 embedded	within	 the	 highly	 politicised	 environment	 of	 the	 carbon	
market	and	climate	change	debates.	This	is	succinctly	put	by	Mackenzie	(2009:	451)	who	states:	
‘There	is	a	great	deal	of	suspicion	of	them	[carbon	markets],	ranging	from	right‐wing	distaste	of	
emission	caps	to	left‐wing	hostility	to	an	extension	of	market	relations’.	Carbon	fraud	discourse	
is	situated	within	this	ideological	contest.		
	
Fraud	and	fraud	risk	case	studies	
Understanding	the	relationships	between	fraud	and	carbon	markets	requires	analysis	of	some	
of	the	carbon	crimes	previously	reported.	This	section	looks	at	a	number	of	the	cases	in	depth	–	
specifically,	 ‘missing	 trader’	 fraud	 in	 the	 European	 Union	markets;	 carbon	 investment	 scams	
identified	 by	 the	Australian	Transaction	Reports	 and	Analysis	 Centre	 (AUSTRAC);	 retailing	 of	
fraudulent	 credits	 by	 Shift2Neutral;	 and	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 fraud	 potential	 in	 offset	 credit	
production	within	the	Kyoto	system.	
	
Missing	trader	fraud	in	tradeable	CO2	permits	
The	EU	ETS	has	experienced	considerable	fraud	events	including	Missing	Trader	Fraud	(MTF);	
internet	password	theft	(Phishing);	cyber‐theft	through	carbon	account	hacking;	and	state	level	
recycling	of	carbon	instruments.	Here	we	examine	the	MTF	case	and	discuss	the	implications	for	
carbon	trading	and	the	relationship	of	this	type	of	fraud	to	the	structure	of	carbon	markets.	
	
On	Tuesday,	June	2,	2009	there	was	a	record	trading	volume	of	19.8	million	carbon	credits	on	
the	BlueNext	exchange,	160	per	cent	higher	than	for	the	average	daily	volume	for	the	first	five	
months	 of	 the	 year	 (7.4	million).	 The	 following	 day,	 trades	 dropped	 to	 2.5	million	 (BlueNext	
2011).	 On	 the	 next	 trading	 day,	 the	 BlueNext	 exchange	was	 closed	 for	 CO2	 spot	 trading,	 and	
rumours	were	spreading	 that	 the	emission	 trading	system	was	affected	by	a	 large	MTF	 fraud.	
Reacting	to	the	risk	of	systemic	damage	to	the	market,	the	French	authorities	acted	on	June	10	
by	 removing	 VAT	 from	 future	 transactions	 	 and	 the	 UK	 followed	 suit	 on	 July	 30,	 effectively	
transforming	emission	allowances	into	securities.	
	
Europol	has	 estimated	 that	 in	2009,	5	billion	euros	were	 lost	by	member	 states	 through	VAT	
Missing	 Trader	 Fraud	 (Europol	 2009)	 although	 this	 figure	might	well	 be	 an	 underestimation	
(Nield	and	Pereira	2011:	259).	Short‐term	loss	of	confidence	was	very	apparent	in	subsequent	
trading	after	the	MTF	was	suspected	to	have	occurred,	with	trading	volumes	reduced	to	record	
low	 levels.	 Ainsworth	 (2009:	 2)	 identifies	 the	problem	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 increased	 concern	 that	
VAT	deductions	will	not	be	forthcoming:	‘The	underlying	difficulty	for	the	CO2	market	is	–	even	
if	there	is	no	fraud	–	just	the	possibility	of	being	denied	millions	of	euro	in	VAT	deductions	is	a	
significant	increase	in	risk.	When	risk	rises,	prices	follow’.		
	
VAT	 MTF	 takes	 advantage	 of	 the	 zero	 VAT	 rating	 on	 purchases	 of	 credits	 from	 another	 EU	
member.	 	Figure	1	is	a	simplified	representation	of	the	fraud	taken	from	Ainsworth	(2009:	5).	
Entity	B	–	the	fraudster,	purchases	CO2	credits	from	Entity	A	at	market	price	but	with	no	VAT	
Peter	Martin	and	Reece	Walters:	Fraud	Risk	and	the	Visibility	of	Carbon	
	
IJCJ&SD						32	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2013	2(2)	
invoiced.	B	then	on	sells	the	credits	to	C	(in	the	same	country)	at	a	slightly	lower	price	to	attract	
buyers	 but	 with	 an	 invoiced	 VAT	 charge	 that	 would	 normally	 be	 remitted	 to	 the	 tax	 office.	
Instead,	Entity	B	goes	‘missing’	and	makes	a	profit	of	15	per	cent	of	credit	price	minus	the	small	
discount.		
	
	
	
Other	member	state	 	 	 UK	
	
	
	
	
 
	
Figure	1:	Simplified	representation	of	the	Missing	Trader	Fraud.	
	
MTF	frauds	are	thought	to	be	much	more	complex	in	practice	but	Figure	1	represents	the	core	
of	the	fraud.	The	associated	complexity	is	mostly	related	to	covering	the	fraud	trail	or	combining	
a	number	of	these	transactions	into	a	‘carousel’	that	can	yield	very	large	amounts	of	money.	
	
The	fraud	relies	on	situations	where	the	transaction	can	happen	quickly;	where	instruments	can	
be	easily	exchange	for	money	(fungible);	and	there	are	many	buyers	and	sellers	(liquid)	in	the	
market	(Ainsworth	2009).	The	quick	sale	is	enhanced	when	trading	is	based	on	narrow	margins	
between	buyers	and	sellers	(again	related	to	liquidity)	and	when	there	is	a	degree	of	anonymity	
between	 buyers	 and	 sellers.	 All	 these	 factors	 are	 systemic	 to	 mature	 markets	 and	 are	
characteristic	of	the	EU	ETS	(Nield	and	Pereira	2011:	256).		Ainsworth	(2009:	14)	identifies	that	
this	fraud	is	a	result	of	 ‘opportunistic	fraudsters	taking	advantage	of	a	temporary	break	in	the	
chain	of	fractionated	payments’.	The	EU	took	centralised	action	to	allow	member	states	to	apply	
a	reverse	charge	through	Council	Directive	2010/23/EU,	but	this	was	an	optional	process	still	
leaving	 many	 EU	 countries	 exposed	 to	 MTF	 (Nield	 and	 Pereira	 2011:260).	 The	 fragmented	
response	 of	 the	participant	nations	 symbolises	 the	 core	problematic	 of	 carbon	 governance	 in	
the	EU	and	beyond	in	terms	of	fraud	potential.	
	
Investment	scams	
Carbon	products	have	joined	the	long	list	of	‘investments’	that	have	formed	the	basis	for	various	
scams	operated	 through	 ‘cold	calling’	 email	or	 telephone.	The	Australian	Transaction	Reports	
and	 Analysis	 Centre	 (AUSTRAC)	 reported	 a	 fake	 carbon	 credits	 investment	 scheme	 that	 cost	
investors	 AU$3.5	 million	 (AUSTRAC	 2011:	 28‐29).	 The	 scammers	 used	 environmental	
discussions	to	draw	out	potential	victims	and	then	placed	follow	up	calls	that	tried	to	convince	
them	of	 financial	 benefits.	 Those	 that	 took	up	 the	 offer	would	 be	 asked	 to	 transfer	money	 to	
accounts	 in	 Taiwan	 and	China.	A	 professional‐looking	website	 had	 been	 constructed	 to	 allow	
victims	 to	view	their	 investment	certificates.	AUSTRAC	attention	 to	 the	 scam	was	 initiated	by	
two	very	 large	 follow‐up	 transfers.	Victims	 subsequently	 reported	 that	 they	 had	no	 access	 to	
their	certificates	and	they	could	not	be	liquidated.	
	
Similar	 investment	 scams	 have	 been	 found	 overseas,	 particularly	 in	 countries	 with	 high	
visibility	 compliance	 and	 voluntary	 carbon	 emissions	 trading	 schemes.	 The	 high	 public	
awareness	 of	 the	 monetisation	 of	 carbon	 leads	 to	 opportunities	 for	 scammers	 to	 attract	
‘investment’	money.	The	Financial	Services	Authority	in	the	UK	has	recently	alerted	the	public	
about	 a	 host	 of	 fraudulent	 carbon	 investment	 schemes	 that	 are	 offered	 to	 investors	 by	
salespeople,	emails,	 telephone	and	postal	mail	or	even	by	 ‘word	of	mouth’	 (Financial	Services	
Authority	2012).	The	Australian	Government’s	SCAMwatch	has	provided	recent	warnings	to	the	
public	 to	be	cautious	when	telephoned	and	offered	rebates	on	the	recently	 introduced	carbon	
price	(SCAMwatch	2012).	Most	compensation	 for	 the	carbon	price	 introduction	has	(and	will)	
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occur	 through	 changes	 in	 the	 tax	 system;	 however,	 because	 of	 the	 relative	 newness	 of	 the	
system	 and	 uncertainty	 created	 through	 robust	 oppositional	 discourse,	 there	 is	 a	 significant	
level	 of	 confusion	 that	 can	 be	 exploited	 by	 scammers.	 Victims	most	 often	 give	 their	 personal	
banking	details	to	the	caller	who	is	impersonating	a	Government	official.	
	
Fraud	in	carbon	credits	for	‘carbon	neutrality’	
	
Alarm	bells	about	Shift2Neutral	have	recently	been	rung	by	the	Tribal	Coalition	of	
Mindanao	who	 in	 late	November	2010	report	 that	a	17	month	old	$500	million	
Tricom	 Caraga	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	 between	 Shift2Neutral	 and	
Indigenous	 tribes	 of	 Caraga	 has	 been	 dissolved.	 The	 tribal	 people	 believe	 that	
they	have	been	conned.	This	follows	on	from	reports	dates	6	October	2010	that	a	
recently	signed	Shift2Neutral	agreement	in	Congo	was	illegal.	(Lang	2010)	
	
Shift2Neutral,	which	claims	to	have	worked	with	the	Sydney	Turf	Club	and	the	Australian	PGA	
to	make	their	events	carbon	neutral,	has	also	been	accused	of	distributing	fake	carbon	(offset)	
credits	 and	 providing	 no	 evidence	 of	 successfully	 negotiating	 carbon	 offset	 programs	 (Cubby	
2011).	
	
Shift2Neutral	does	not	just	retail	 ‘credits’	for	the	voluntary	market;	it	becomes	involved	in	the	
sourcing	 of	 them,	 allegedly	 through	 deals	 that	 are	 not	 strictly	 illegal	 but	 rather	 create	 the	
impression	 of	 legitimacy	which	 carries	 over	 to	 their	 credit	 sales.	 	 Typically,	 they	will	 talk	 to	
somebody	with	 influence	or	with	an	 influential	 title	 in	 the	project	country,	 such	as	 the	Congo	
senator	 in	 the	 example	 below	 or	 a	 particular	 tribal	 elder,	 and	 then	 write	 a	 press	 release	
regarding	the	deal	even	though	these	potential	partners	rarely	have	the	authority	to	deliver	the	
project.	 	 The	 case	 of	 the	 Congo	 deal	 is	 instructive.	 The	 principal	 of	 Shift2Neutral,	 Peter	
Goldsworthy,	released	the	following	press	statement	on	his	web	site:	
	
Shift2Neutral	and	its	partners	sign	an	exclusive	environmental	contract	with	the	
Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo	 through	 its	 Provinces,	 Tribal	 Chiefs,	 Land	
Owners	 and	 the	 spokesperson	 of	 the	 senate	 has	 signed	 a	 progressive	 (step	 by	
step)	 agreement	 with	 Shift2Neutral	 for	 environment	 and	 renewable	 energy	 to	
protect	 the	 forests,	 flora	 and	 fauna	 and	 improve	 the	 standard	 of	 living	 to	 the	
Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo.	(Goldsworthy	cited	in	Lang	2010)	
	
In	Shift2Neutral’s	view,	two	separate	signings	took	place:	
	
1. Shift2Neutral	 and	 its	 partners	 (whoever	 they	 are)	 signed	 an	 ‘environmental	 contract’	
with	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	through	its	Provinces,	Tribal	Chiefs	and	Land	
Owners.	
2. The	spokesperson	of	the	senate	signed	an	agreement	with	Shift2Neutral.	This	agreement	
is	‘progressive’	(step	by	step)	for	‘environment	and	renewable	energy’.	
	
However,	shortly	after,	the	Minister	declared	the	agreement	‘null	and	void’	and	illegal.	This	was	
never	 reported	 on	 the	 Shift2Neutral	website.	 Indeed,	 the	 NGO	 REDD‐Monitor	 which	 records	
projects	recognised	under	the	UN‐REDD	program	has	never	found	any	official	agreements	and	
suggests	 that,	 if	 Shift2Neutral	was	 really	doing	 these	publicised	deals,	 it	would	be	 the	biggest	
REDD	operator	in	the	world.	This	‘alienation’	of	the	tradable	credit	from	the	project	source	is	a	
particular	 problem	 with	 carbon‐related	 crimes	 and	 is	 discussed	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 the	
examination	of	Kyoto‐based	credits.	
	
Shift2Neutral	is	one	of	many	brokers	operating	in	the	voluntary	(offset)	carbon	market	and	is	a	
classic	 example	 of	 a	 high‐risk	 broker.	 A	 cursory	 examination	 of	 its	 website	 reveals	 that	 it	
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provides	 ‘its	 own	 certification	 standard	 and	 solution’	 (Shift2Neutral	 2013).	 	 Similarly,	 the	
description	of	projects	 is	mainly	 in	 terms	of	broad	 types	of	projects	 rather	 than	any	 specifics	
about	location	and	how	the	project	generates	carbon	savings.		
	
In	Australia,	carbon	credit	sale	and	claims	of	carbon	‘neutrality’	of	products	are	regulated	under	
the	 Trade	 Practices	 Act	 1974	 (the	 Act)	 administered	 by	 the	 Australian	 Competition	 and	
Consumer	 Commission	 (ACCC)	 (see	 ACCC	 2008).	 The	 Act	 provides	 for	 penalties	 for	 false	 or	
misleading	representations	or	conduct	but	has	no	regulatory	authority	over	the	production	of	
credits	and	provides	no	governance	framework	that	would	mitigate	against	double	counting	of	
credits	(Wilcox	and	Rennie	2012).	Further,	it	does	not	have	the	capability	to	check	the	integrity	
of	the	credits	since	many	are	sourced	overseas.	Notwithstanding	the	involvement	of	the	ACCC,	
the	 potential	 for	 fraud	 in	 these	markets	 rests	 on	 the	 capability	 of	 consumers	 to	 discern	 the	
relative	risk	of	particular	credits.	 Importantly,	 the	 transfer	of	 risk	 from	brokers	 to	consumers	
(or	 producers	 to	 brokers)	 is	 significant	 here.	 Within	 the	 chain	 of	 credit	 production,	 broking	
(buying	 and	 selling)	 and	 ‘consumption’	 (called	 retirement),	 the	 potential	 for	 fraud	 and	 its	
subsequent	 discovery	 varies,	 and	 hence	 the	 motivation	 for	 ‘due	 diligence’	 by	 the	 different	
entities	varies.		
	
The	bulk	(92	per	cent)	of	carbon	credit	purchasers	is	corporations	and	half	of	their	purchases	
are	 for	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 or	 branding	 reasons	 and	 the	 balance	 for	 investment	
(Peters‐Stanley	 and	 Hamilton	 2012:	 vii).	 Some	 corporations	 also	 purchase	 accredited	 carbon	
credits	to	prepare	for	future	compliance	requirements	(pre‐compliance).	All	these	credit	‘uses’	
have	 very	 significant	 market,	 financial	 and	 reputational	 consequences	 if	 the	 credits	 were	
exposed	 as	 fraudulent.	 Making	 bold	 claims	 regarding	 carbon	 neutrality	 may	 be	 positive	 for	
marketing	but	also	risk	attracting	the	‘spotlight’	of	NGOs	and	other	social	movements	which	are	
aware	 of	 ‘green	 washing’	 and	 are	 highly	 motivated	 to	 identify	 and	 publicise	 it.	 This	 type	 of	
exposure	is	a	magnified	risk	–	relative	to	that	associated	with	the	sellers	of	credits	–	and	there	
would	 be	 significant	 motivation	 and	 capacity	 for	 the	 purchaser	 to	 perform	 detailed	 ‘due	
diligence’	and	subsequent	pressure	for	market	(self)	regulation,	as	in	the	case	of	HSBC	in	2005.	
Their	strategy	to	achieve	carbon	neutrality	included	an	initial	investigation	into	the	integrity	of	
the	 voluntary	market	 and	 they	 concluded	 that:	 ‘There	will	 be	 individuals	 and	 companies	 out	
there	who	think	they're	doing	the	right	thing	but	they're	not.	I	am	sure	that	people	are	buying	
offsets	 in	 this	 unregulated	 market	 that	 are	 not	 credible.	 I	 am	 sure	 there	 are	 people	 buying	
nothing	more	than	hot	air’	(Adam	2006).	HSBC	went	on	to	source	their	own	credits,	bypassing	
the	large	brokers.	
	
We	do	not	imply	from	this	that	significant	carbon	fraud	will	simply	be	eliminated	through	the	
market	 ‘wising	 up’.	 In	 fact,	 as	we	 identified	 above,	 the	 risk	 of	 exposure	 and	 reputational	 and	
economic	damage	that	may	ensue	is	very	much	related	to	social	and	political	phenomena	in	the	
form	of	active	NGOs	and	social	movements.	As	some	of	the	recent	 ‘actor‐network’	approaches	
have	 emphasised,	 markets	 are	 not	 just	 situated	 in	 a	 social	 vacuum,	 and	 carbon	 markets,	 as	
‘proxy’	markets,	are	highly	constructed	through	the	attempt	to	make	carbon	‘visible’	(Mackenzie	
2009).	 In	 fact,	 even	 those	 highly	 critical	 of	 the	 voluntary	 carbon	 markets	 recognise	 that	
resistance	and	critique	have	also	 shaped	 their	development	 (Paterson	2010).	Paterson	makes	
the	point	that	the	proliferation	of	certification	systems	for	carbon	credits	that	ease	the	burden	
of	 due‐diligence	 is	 largely	 related	 to	 a	 nexus	 of	 oppositional	 forces	 and	market	 participants.	
These	 certifications	 and	 their	 range	 of	 standards	 have	 also	 served	 to	 differentiate	 carbon	
products	 based	 around	 the	 level	 of	 project	 integrity,	 sectoral	 inclusion	 or	 exclusion	 (forestry	
credit	 projects	 are	 seen	 to	 be	 highly	 risky),	 and	 social	 justice	 issues	 (cf.	 Social	 Carbon	
Standards).	Whilst	many	of	these	standards	were	initiated	by	NGOs	such	as	the	Gold	Standard	
by	World	Wildlife	Fund	in	2003,	many	now	are	organised	by	groups	of	corporations	which,	as	
Paterson	 (2010:	 249)	 comments:	 ‘clearly	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 corporate	 capture	 of	 the	
verification	 process’.	 Government	 or	 supra‐government	 standards	 for	 offset	 credits	 have	 also	
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evolved,	mainly	 in	response	 to	quality	concerns	 for	 their	use	 in	the	compliance	cap‐and‐trade	
market.	Credits	certified	through	these	processes	are	also	available	on	the	voluntary	market.	
	
Fraud	in	certified	offset	projects	
The	 requirement	 for	 ‘additionality’	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 controversial	 aspects	 of	 offset	 projects	
because	 it	 requires	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 ‘imaginary’	 emissions	 future	 or	 baseline	 to	 be	
extrapolated	from	the	current	emissions	context.	In	essence,	the	purpose	of	this	offset	policy	is	
to	 ensure	 that	 greenhouse	 gas	 reductions	 are	 ‘in	 addition	 to	 what	 would	 have	 happened	
anyway’	(Prairie	2013).	That	is,	for	credits	to	be	issued,	the	projects	do	not	have	to	demonstrate	
a	 sequestration	 of	 carbon	 (gross	 reduction)	 but	 a	 net	 reduction	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 imaginary	
baseline	(that	is,	what	would	have	happened	in	the	absence	of	the	project).	Hence,	projects	such	
as	supplying	more	efficient	cooking	systems	in	villages	have	produced	carbon	credits.	However,	
establishing	 an	 imaginary	 future	 baseline	 is	 susceptible	 to	misrepresentation	 and	a	 relatively	
easy	 target	 for	 fraud	 (Barr	2011:	331‐333).	Earlier	 empirical	 studies	of	 additionality	 of	offset	
projects	 have	 indentified	 that	 up	 to	 one‐half	 of	 all	 initiatives	 had	dubious	 or	 no	 additionality	
(Brown	2010;	Schneider	2007:	9).		
	
There	 are	 several	 types	 of	 systemic	 failure	 and	 misrepresentation.	 First,	 perverse	 incentive	
structures	 can	 motivate	 project	 developers	 to	 maximise	 carbon	 credit	 returns	 by	 increasing	
emissions	prior	to	project	so	as	to	increase	the	‘imaginary’	future	baseline.	The	most	prominent	
example	of	this	is	the	incentive	(in	developing	countries)	to	keep	producing	potent	GHGs	such	
as	hydroflurocarbons	 (HFC‐23s)	because	of	 the	 low	cost	of	destruction	compared	 to	 the	huge	
receipt	of	carbon	credits.	In	2008,	HFC‐23	offsets	comprised	55	per	cent	of	Certified	Emission	
Reduction	(CER)	credits	 issued	by	 in	 the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM)	process	–	 the	
primary	 source	of	 internationally	 regulated	 credits.	Credits	derived	 from	HFC	projects	 are	no	
longer	 exchangeable	 on	 the	 EU	 ETS.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 HFC‐23s,	 rather	 than	 governments	 in	
developing	 countries	 prohibiting	 their	 production,	 they	 instead	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 offset	
scheme	through	 imposition	of	high	 taxes	on	credits	 issued.	Further,	 the	piecemeal	project‐by‐
project	approval	of	additionality	takes	little	consideration	of	national	level	policy	which	may	(in	
the	case	of	China)	be	committed	to	emission	reduction	and	increasing	renewable	energy	–	in	the	
absence	of	the	CDM	or	other	offset	schemes.	Hence,	the	actual	‘imaginary’	baseline	may	be	well	
below	that	determined	at	the	local	level.	Whilst	China	has	committed	to	renewables,	in	2007,	all	
new	projects	based	on	renewables	or	lower	carbon	emitters	had	applied	for	CER	credits	(Wara	
and	Victor	2008:	13).	
	
The	problem	of	additionality	is	an	inherent	weakness	in	offset	projects,	the	extent	of	which	will	
vary	 in	accordance	with	 the	 locational	and	technical	details	of	 the	project	 itself.	Projects	most	
susceptible	 are	 those	 that	 provide	 credits	 for	maintaining	 particular	 emission	 levels	 (such	 as	
conservation	 forests	 as	 carbon	 sinks)	 where	 the	 calculations	 of	 additionality	 are	 based	 on	
assumptions	of	 future	use	 that	may	degrade	 the	 sink.	One	can	 imagine	situations	where	 local	
collusion	might	occur	in	relation	to	future	land	use	and,	in	establishing	a	baseline,	propose	sink	
degradation	activities	that	may	never	have	been	undertaken	in	reality.	The	other	component	of	
additionality	is	the	estimation	of	carbon	benefits	from	the	proposed	project.	Whilst	this	is	less	
subjective	 than	 determining	 the	 baseline,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 various	 forms	 of	 corruption	 and	
organised	 criminal	 activity	 could	 influence	 the	 verification	process.	As	 in	 the	 case	of	 baseline	
misrepresentation	or	fraud,	projects	at	risk	include	those	where	carbon	verification	is	difficult	
and	complex	and	perhaps	methodologically	novel.	Barr	(2011:	335),	drawing	on	earlier	work	by	
Ross	(2001),	also	makes	the	point	that	powerful	state	actors	could	find	it	financially	rewarding	
to	over‐report	emissions	for	short	periods	of	time.	
	
There	are	a	number	of	studies	(Barr	2011;	Brown	2010;	Drew	and	Drew	2010)	that	point	to	the	
vulnerability	 of	 verification	 and	 validation	 processes	 in	 the	 Kyoto	 based	 CDM	 process,	 the	
largest	 offset	 scheme.	 Significantly,	 CER	 credits	 from	 these	 projects	 can	 be	 traded	 with	 the	
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largest	carbon	trading	system,	the	EU	ETS.	They	are	also	traded	in	secondary	markets.	Attention	
to	deficits	in	the	CDM	process	was	heightened	in	2006	when	spot	checks	by	UN	inspectors	found	
significant	 irregularities	 in	work	by	 three	prominent	verifiers	 (Schneider	2007:	24).	 In	 fact,	 a	
general	review	of	verifiers’	reports	indicated:		
	
From	 [the]	 review	 of	 available	 documentation	 it	 appears	 that	 current	
methodological	guidance	from	the	Board	is	either	not	applied	or,	if	applied,	is	not	
always	 documented.	 ...	 Validation	 reports	 for	 some	 registered	 CDM	 projects	
indicate	 that	efforts	 to	corroborate	additionality	claims	were	undertaken,	other	
cases	 with	 no	 such	 indications	 were	 found	 ...	 The	 available	 documentation	
provides	 little	evidence	of	external	validation	by	DOEs	 [Designated	Operational	
Entities]	of	key	assumptions	and	data	used	for	additionality	assessment,	though	
such	evidence	may	exist	elsewhere.	(CDM	2008:	3)	
	
In	 2009,	 UN	 inspectors	 suspended	 the	 largest	 verifier,	 SGS	 UK,	 because	 of	 poor	 quality	
documentation	and	 lack	of	adequate	qualifications	of	 their	 staff.	The	process	of	verification	 is	
integral	 to	 safeguarding	 against	 fraud.	 However,	 the	 offset	 verification	 industry	 is	 very	 price	
competitive	with	 revenue	per	project	declining	 and	verifiers	 highly	 dependent	on	 the	project	
developers	 (Brown	2010).	As	project	developers	 try	 to	cut	costs,	 they	search	 for	 the	verifiers	
with	 the	 lowest	 fees,	with	 the	 issue	of	 verification	quality	not	being	 considered	 an	 important	
price	 factor.	 Furthermore,	 oversight	 of	 verifiers	 by	 CDM	 is	 limited	 by	 insufficient	 resources	
(Schneider	 2007).	 Concerns	 have	 also	 been	 expressed	 regarding	 firms	 providing	 consulting	
advice	to	project	developers	and	acting	as	verifiers	for	the	project	(Bachram	2004:	5).	
	
The	 case	 of	 the	 CDM	 program	 is	 instructive	 for	 all	 other	 verified	 offset	 projects.	 Incentive	
structures	should	encourage	objective	verification	and	oversight	from	regulators	and	need	to	be	
robust	and	sufficiently	resourced.	
	
A	 particularly	 vulnerable	 area	 for	 fraud	 and	 corruption	 is	 the	 potential	 for	 various	 forms	 of	
pressure	 to	 be	 applied	 on	 local	 people.	 Schneider’s	 (2007:	 51‐53)	 review	 of	 stakeholder	
consultation	in	CDMs	is	critical	of	the	lack	of	detail	and	concern	for	the	local	people	who	might	
be	 affected.	 Only	 40	 per	 cent	 of	 project	 development	 documents	 had	 invited	 all	 relevant	
stakeholders	 to	 comment	on	 the	project.	CDM	projects	must	also	be	approved	at	 the	national	
level	by	the	Designated	National	Authority	(DNA).	Criteria	for	approval,	provided	by	the	UN,	are	
simply	 that	 the	 project	 achieves	 sustainable	 development	 objectives.	 Brown	 (2010:	 250)	
suggests	that,	because	DNA	can	accept	or	reject	projects	in	the	absence	of	decision	making	rules,	
the	 fortunes	 of	 a	 project	 could	 be	 influenced	 by	 bribery.	 Accusations	 of	 illegality	 in	 offset	
projects	 have	 mainly	 been	 in	 tropical	 forest	 contexts	 in	 developing	 countries.	 Here,	 the	
structural	conditions	for	fraud	and	corruption	mean	that	projects	could	be	more	risky	and	that	
the	establishment	of	‘carbon	credit’	forests	could	occur	through	deception	or	bribery.	In	Papua	
New	Guinea	 (PNG)	 and	 Peru,	 accusations	 have	 been	made	 that	 private	 developers	 and	NGOs	
have	targeted	the	tropical	forests	to	encourage	indigenous	leaders	to	sign	away	their	rights	to	
the	 forest.	 In	 these	 instances,	 it	 has	 been	 reported	 that	 Peruvian	 indigenous	 peoples,	 for	
example,	have	been	pressured	to	sign	agreements	they	cannot	read	in	acts	described	as	‘carbon	
piracy’	(Vidal	2011).	Moreover,	accusations	were	made	of	PNG	officials	producing	fake	carbon	
credit	certificates	as	a	prop	 for	explaining	carbon	credit	deals	 to	 local	 leaders	(Wilkinson	and	
Cubby	2009).	
	
Structural	conditions	for	fraud	and	corruption	
The	 risks	 of	 carbon	 fraud	 are	 heightened	 by	 structural	 conditions	 under	 which	 corruption	
proliferate.	 The	 growth	 in	 illegal	 forestry	 over	 the	 last	 decade	 (Contreras‐Hermosilla	 2002)	
provides	 the	contexts	 for	emerging	carbon	 frauds	 to	 flourish.	Such	contexts	are	worth	noting.	
First,	 geographic	 remoteness	 of	 projects	 undertaken	 in	 isolated	 areas,	 distant	 from	 public	
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scrutiny	 and	 difficult	 to	 monitor,	 affects	 the	 capacity	 of	 governing	 institutions	 to	 adequately	
administer	projects	and	to	enforce	the	law.	Second,	low	levels	of	economic	development,	where	
a	country	or	province	 lacks	sophisticated	monitoring	of	resources	and	can	afford	only	a	small	
and	 poorly	 trained	 bureaucracy,	 can	 mean	 that	 policing	 and	 intelligence	 services	 are	 weak,	
poorly	trained	and	poorly	paid.	Unstable,	inexperienced	and	poorly	financed	public	sectors	are	
more	likely	to	be	involved	in	bribery	and	corruption	(White	2011).	Third,	weak	governance	and	
under‐resourced	 regulation	 that	 is	 poorly	 organised	 or	 stretched	 over	 large	 areas	 with	
inadequate	lines	of	responsibility	and	accountability	can	lead	to	exploitation	of	administrators	
and	 police	 in	 small	 isolated	 pockets	 by	 criminals,	 through	 bribery	 and	 corruption.	 Fourth,	
unclear	 land	 tenure	 systems	 or	 under‐developed	 land	 registers	 and	 tenure	 systems	 with	
complex	 community‐based	 or	 customary	 land	 ownership	 systems	 can	 also	 be	 exploited	 by	
criminals	who	 are	 intent	 on	 land	 grabs	 or	 ‘divide‐and‐conquer’	 approaches	 to	 gaining	 power	
over	land	ownership	(Wily	2008).	
	
Most	 of	 the	 above	 conditions	 occur	 in	 countries	 where	 the	 newly	 accredited	 UN	 Reducing	
Emissions	 from	 Deforestation	 and	 Forest	 Degradation	 (REDD+)	 program	 will	 occur.	 This	
program	produced	carbon	credits	for	forest	sink	conservation	and	development	and	expects	to	
supply	 funds	between	US$17‐33billion	every	year,	much	of	which	will	 be	destined	 for	 forest‐
rich	 developing	 countries.	 The	 program	 is	 not	 just	 project‐based	 but	 intends	 to	 compensate	
governments,	communities,	companies	and	individuals	in	developing	countries	that	undertake	
to	 reduce	 emissions	 loss	 from	 forests.	 The	 huge	 sums	 of	 money	 involved	 and	 structural	
conditions	in	these	countries	have	NGOs	greatly	concerned	with	potential	fraud,	corruption	and	
bribery	 (see	 Global	Witness	 2011).	 The	 significance	 of	 REDD+‐originated	 carbon	 credits	 will	
increase	markedly	 in	 2013	when	 the	 EU	 ETS	 preferentially	 requires	 credits	 from	 developing	
countries.	
	
Green	criminology	and	the	visibility	of	carbon	
There	are	numerous	directions	one	could	take	with	the	above	discussion.	For	now	we	wish	to	
pursue	emerging	landscapes	of	carbon	fraud	within	discourses	in	Green	Criminology.	We	do	this	
for	two	reasons.	First,	advocates	of	the	green	criminological	enterprise	are	wedded	to	a	project	
that	pursues	environmental	issues	through	a	lens	of	social	justice	whilst	advancing	human	and	
animal	 rights	 (South	 and	 Brisman	 2013).	 Criminological	 analyses	 of	 climate	 change	 (South	
2012;	White	2012)	and	air	pollution	(Halsey	2013;	Walters	2010)	have	 identified	 the	ways	 in	
which	 state	 and	 corporate	 power	 advance	 trade	 and	 fiscal	 policies.	 Such	 works	 inevitably	
involve	 an	 examination	 and	 intersection	 of	 the	 concepts	 of	 harm,	 power	 and	 justice,	 most	
notably	in	the	ways	that	power	is	mobilised	to	justify	a	market	model	of	capitalism	with	unjust	
and	harmful	consequences	for	the	environment	and	the	world’s	most	vulnerable	peoples.	Much	
of	 this	 is	 relevant	 to	 carbon	 trading	 and	 emerging	 fraud	 risks.	 Second,	 green	 criminology	
continues	 to	 ‘harness	 both	 risks	 and	 rights’	 in	 pursuit	 of	 a	 global	 criminology	 (Aas	 2007;	
Walters	 2007:199)	 that	 involves	 uncovering	 or	 rendering	 visible	 those	 ‘deviations’	 or	
‘irregularities’	that	exploit	and	harm	the	environment	for	maximum	profit	(South	1998).	
	
In	the	introduction	to	this	article,	we	used	the	notion	of	economic	‘visibility’	to	contextualise	the	
problem	 of	 fraud	 in	 carbon	 markets.	 We	 identified	 that	 political	 and	 institutional	 change	
allowed	 for	 economic	 penalties	 and	 substantial	 profits	 for	 those	 involved	 in,	 respectively,	
producing	 and	 consuming	 GHGs.	 Of	 course,	 the	 discourse	 of	 human	 induced	 ‘excessive’	 GHG	
emissions	has	had	some	political	import	for	about	30	years:	for	example,	the	 ‘The	Greenhouse	
Effect’	 in	the	1980s;	later	 ‘Global	Warming’;	and	now	‘Climate	Change’.	The	scientific	certainty	
has	 intensified,	 political	 support	 developed	 and	 new	 technologies	 of	 practice	 such	 as	 carbon	
markets	 instituted.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 cogently	 that	 the	 relative	 success	 of	 carbon	 market	
institutionalisation	has	come	about	through	political	coalitions	between	powerful	actors	such	as	
financiers	 and	 environmentalists	 (Paterson	 2012:	 59).	 Importantly,	 some	 fractions	 of	 capital	
that	rely	on	high	energy	consumption,	at	least	in	the	short	term,	are	losers	and	other	fractions	
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such	 as	 the	 insurance	 industry	 and	 sunrise	 technology	 industries	 will	 benefit	 from	 climate	
change	reduction.	We	argue	that	such	actors	have	provided	carbon	with	a	cultural	and	economic	
visibility	that	has	enabled	new	criminal	enterprises.	It	is	not	a	visibility	linked	to	surveillance	or	
‘panoptic	power’	as	Majid	Yar	has	argued	(Yar	2003),	nor	a	visibility	mediated	through	police	
(see	Mawby	1999)	or	social	media	(Thomson	2005);	rather	it	is	an	emerging	criminal	risk	that	
has	emerged	through	social	and	political	agreement	about	 the	status	of	 carbon	as	a	 tradeable	
entity	 for	 a	 collective	 global	 good.	 Its	 property	 or	 commodity	 status	 has	 been	 uncontested	
within	a	 landscape	of	 reasoning	and	understandings	premised	on	 the	persuasive	platforms	of	
environmental	 ethics	 and	 trade.	 As	 Langer	 (1957)	 once	 famously	 wrote:	 ‘the	 visible	 is	 not	
simply	 the	 visual’,	 a	 reference	 to	 emerging	meanings	within	 the	hidden	 text	of	 image.	 For	us,	
carbon	dioxide	discharges	 are	 constructed	within	 carbon	markets	not	 as	 toxic	 and	poisonous	
gases	but	as	economic	entities	or	commodities	for	global	trade	in	GHG	emission	reductions.	The	
entities,	 like	the	gases	themselves,	are	not	visual,	but	have	been	made	visible	through	political	
and	 economic	processes	of	 discourse.	 It	 is	 these	processes	 that	have	 created	 the	 contexts	 for	
new	forms	of	fraud.	
	
Fraud,	as	one	of	the	more	elusive	and	adaptable	crimes,	has	exploited	this	increased	economic	
visibility	in	carbon	markets.	Further,	as	demonstrated	in	the	case	of	missing	trader	fraud	of	VAT	
in	the	EU	ETS,	fraud	does	not	just	impose	extensive	financial	losses	on	states,	corporations	and	
individuals.	 Its	 existence	 strikes	 at	 the	heart	 of	 the	 capacity	 of	 these	 technologies	 to	 function	
and	 deliver	 emission	 reductions.	 Markets	 only	 effectively	 coordinate	 and	 alter	 behaviour	 if	
transaction	risks	are	 low	and	participants	play	by	the	systems	rules.	Further,	more	significant	
consequences	entail	 from	the	exploitation	of	 fraud	events	 for	political	purposes,	such	as	 from	
this	by‐line	in	The	Australian:	‘Tony	Abbott	[Opposition	leader	in	the	Australian	Parliament]	has	
seized	on	warnings	about	fraud	in	international	emissions	trading	schemes	as	a	reason	to	dump	
Labor's	planned	carbon	tax’.	Abbott	was	quoted	as	saying:	‘I	think	that	we	are	going	to	have	to	
have	a	very	intrusive	carbon	cop	if	an	emissions	trading	scheme	carbon	tax	goes	ahead’	(cited	in	
Barrett	2011).	The	fraud	in	the	EU	ETS	–	a	fraud	very	specific	to	VAT	or	a	goods	and	services	tax	
(GST)	 and	 requiring	 a	 rapid,	 tradeable	 context	 –	 is	 generalised	 to	 the	 Australian	 tax	 scheme	
which	is	not	tradeable	and	has	no	VAT	or	GST.		
	
Fraud	and	fraud	risk	in	the	regulated	offset	project	markets	has	also	had	significant	influence	on	
the	attractiveness	of	carbon	credits	in	the	compliance	cap‐and‐trade	systems.	Whilst	there	are	
few	cases	of	established	fraud	in	Australia,	there	is	considerable	potential	for	misrepresentation	
because	of	the	criteria	used	to	establish	emission	reduction	from	baselines	(the	‘counterfactual’)	
and	concerns	about	the	procedural	integrity	of	validation	and	verification.	It	is	likely	that	fraud	
risk	has	contributed	to	the	decline	in	value	of	CERs	and	Emission	Reduction	Units	derived	from	
the	CDM	and	these	Kyoto‐regulated	offset	credits	are	now	being	limited	in	terms	of	access	to	the	
large	cap‐and‐trade	systems.	The	phase	three	of	the	EU	ETS	has	almost	halved	the	total	cap	of	
these	units	eligible	to	be	swapped	with	European	Union	Allowances	(Kossoy	and	Guigon	2012:	
21).	Also,	credits	 from	projects	 that	 involve	the	disposal	of	GHGs	(such	as	hydroflurocarbons)	
and	that	have	been	open	to	rorting	by	nation	states	will	be	no	longer	tradeable	with	allowances	
from	the	EU	ETS.	Australia’s	proposed	cap‐and‐trade	system	will	be	open	to	a	maximum	of	12.5	
per	 cent	of	 international	Kyoto	units	but	will	 accept	100	per	 cent	 of	offsets	derived	 from	 the	
domestic	Carbon	Farming	Initiative.	The	new	Californian	cap‐and‐trade	scheme	also	has	strict	
guidelines	 for	 credit	 use	 with	 only	 six	 per	 cent	 exchangeable	 with	 allowances	 for	 each	
compliance	 period	 and	 an	 ‘invalidation’	 regulation	 that	 can	 remove	 credits	 from	 registries	 if	
projects	are	 found	to	be	 invalid	within	a	period	of	eight	years	 from	issue	(Kossoy	and	Guigon	
2012:	118).	
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Conclusion	
As	 is	often	the	case,	new	markets	provide	new	criminal	enterprises	and	this	article	concludes	
that	the	cultural	and	economic	visibilities	of	carbon	have	provided	new	opportunities	for	fraud	
and	 tax	 evasion.	 Carbon	 markets	 are	 an	 extension	 of	 neoliberal	 governance	 and	 the	
commodification	of	nature.	For	some,	carbon	crime	is	symptomatic	of	wider	systemic	properties	
of	 carbon	 marketisation	 that	 are	 inherently	 corruptible	 (Lohmann,	 2010)	 and	 fraudulent	
(Bachram	 2004).	 Others,	 however,	 argue	 that	 ‘marketisation’	 of	 carbon	 is	 a	 political	 project	
itself	and	can	be	shaped	by	social	concern	for	its	negative	consequences	(MacKenzie	2009).		
	
Carbon	 is	 a	 unique	 product	 for	 marketisation.	 Investments	 in	 carbon	 offsets	 projects	 rely	
heavily	 on	 brokers	 for	 advice.	 Unlike	 most	 ‘commodities’,	 carbon	 is	 an	 entity	 without	 a	
designated	 origin	 that	 cannot	 be	 assessed	 for	 market	 performance	 and	 due	 diligence.	 The	
complex	 carousel	 frauds	 in	 Europe	 have	 resulted	 in	 Governments	 providing	 VAT	 exemptions	
from	 carbon	 transactions.	 This	 article	 concludes	 that	 an	 uncontested,	 under‐researched	 and	
unchallenged	trade‐oriented	 instrument,	embedded	as	 it	 is	 in	discourses	of	environmentalism	
and	climate	change	and	granted	social	and	economic	visibility	by	powerful	actors,	has	provided	
the	contexts	for	fake	offsets;	fabrication	of	carbon	certificates;	bribery	of	government	officials;	
and	the	exploitation	of	Indigenous	and	poor	peoples	in	developing	countries.	
	
The	 world‐wide	 trade	 in	 pollution	 is	 a	 market‐led	 model	 to	 provide	 solutions	 to	 market	
problems.	It	has	unfolded,	like	so	many	trade	centred	initiatives,	without	due	consideration	for	
social	 and	 environmental	 justice.	 	 Green	 criminology	 continues	 to	 place	 such	 topics	 on	 the	
international	political	and	intellectual	agenda.	 In	doing	so,	 it	reserves	a	special	and	significant	
place	to	identify	environmental	injustice	and	corruption	when	it	appears	as	progress.	
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